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The Ghost in the Law School:
How Duncan Kennedy Caught
the Hierarchy Zeitgeist but
Missed the Point
Steve Sheppard
Twenty years ago Duncan Kennedy quietly self-published his manifesto
Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy: A Polemic Against the System.
The quiet did not last long and, in the years since, Kennedy's polemic has
been a persistent lightning rod of notjust crit lit, but law school lit generally.
Decades later, we are still appraising Kennedy's work, whether with applause
or catcalls.
Polemics might seem easy to write, but the truth is that they are hard work.
A polemic is no mere exercise of passion. It must be an argument against an
orthodoxy.' As we who learned law in the crit-laden 1980s should say, we
cannot just trash; we must also map. A Polemic Against the System does both in
captivating style. The purpose of the present article is to explore one source of
that captivation, the notion of hierarchy Kennedy tapped, and then to assess
the conclusions drawn from it-his call for active resistance to hierarchy.
Kennedy's argument is well known, and a symposium considering the
manifesto is hardly the place for a long-winded recitation. Still, a brief sum-
mary will help those readers who haven't read the other symposium pieces in
this issue or the lovely commemorative edition with critiques from NYU Press,
but are just hitting this essay through some mischance of a computer search
engine. The rest of you might as well just skip (the short) part I and go to part
II, where the path of Kennedy's law is less heavily trod. There we encounter
the background to the polemic, the tools for the assault, by considering the
state of the theory of hierarchies, particularly at the time Kennedy wrote.
Steve Sheppard is an associate professor of law at the University of Arkansas-Fayetteville.
1. The notion of the polemic as a device in rhetoric is ancient, most closely associated with the
Socratic school of Megara founded by Euclid, known as Eristics (and sometimes called the
Megarians). The Eristics synthesized Eleatic metaphysics with Socratic principles, supporting
a claim that there is no division between the actual and the possible, and so the good is the
only form of being. See James Mark Baldwin, Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology 496
(NewYork, 1901). The second edition of the Oxford English Dictionary supplies an example of
the earliest English usage of polemic apropos of Kennedy's purposes. "Unhappy we, amidst
our many and diverse contentions, furious polemicks, endless variances, . .. debates and
quarrels!" William Drummond of Hawthornden, Irene, a Remonstrance for Concord Amongst
His Majesty's Subjects (1638).
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There we find a domain of hierarchical theory grown suddenly not only rich
but also famous atjust the time Kennedy tapped into it.
From this domain is grounded, in part III, a different argument of hierar-
chy, one that accepts Kennedy's most trenchant observations of the injustice
of the hierarchies of the law but reaches the opposite conclusion, no matter
how unfashionable. A law student who would pursue justice need not reject
the hierarchies of the law. A law student who would pursue justice must-and
can-conquer the hierarchies of the law.
I. The Polemic: Law School as Breeder of Hierarchy
The essence of Kennedy's polemic resounds in his opening salvo. His essay
describes "the ways in which legal education contributes to the reproduction
of illegitimate hierarchy in the bar and in society" as well as ways students and
teachers can become part of a "left activist practice of social transformation."
He hopes students as well as professors will reject what they learn about law
(other than its most basic skills). What teachers teach about the law and
lawyering is biased nonsense. The only valid response is to destroy these
hierarchies. 2 Thus Kennedy's call: "Resist!"
The hierarchies Kennedy categorizes have entered the lore of the law. He
presents at least four hierarchies within law schools, and four more, nurtured
in the law schools but manifested in the legal profession and the law itself.
A. Kennedy's Hierarchies
Each of Kennedy's hierarchies exhibits four essential features, three of
which he identifies, and one of which he implies. The implication is that each
hierarchy exists in some discernible organization-some unit or relationship
that makes it distinct from others (such as a unit comprising a lawyer and
client, or a single law firm, or the bar as a whole, or the profession as it regards
its clients or as it regards society). Each organization or relationship is hierar-
chical, and each hierarchy exists either in an organic unit of people or among
people in specific relationships. Kennedy describes three aspects of all of his
hierarchies. First, each organization differentiates various roles, with special-
izations allocated to each role. There is an unequal distribution of rewards
among roles, with shares better for some than others. Second, each hierarchy
is located within a cultural framework that gives significance to the various
roles and rewards. And third, hierarchies are functionally related, incorporat-
ing smaller hierarchies within larger and sharing certain values and rewards
among one another (42-43).1
2. Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy: A Polemic Against
the System (A Critical Edition) i-ii (New York, 2004). Hereafter page references will be in
parentheses in the text.
3. Kennedy goes further in his theory of hierarchies, depicting them not as pyramids but as
diamond shapes, with their population greatest in the middle rather than the bottom. Any
given hierarchy has variances in tastes, capacities, and values among people in the same
stratum. Hierarchies are organized in small operational cells, each crossing various strata of
the larger hierarchy, and each cell mirroring the larger hierarchy in organization. The cells
are coherently and analogously organized, and the whole is organized complexly and
fundamentally supported by the threat of violence to support its ideology (84-97).
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It helps in reading Kennedy's theory to know of his caveats from the outset.
In chapter 7 Kennedy notes that one of the reasons he likes "hierarchy" is that
it is a vague concept, open to great theoretical play but useless in "hard-edged
theory." That vagueness brings problems, though, embracing some relation-
ships that are evil, some that are not, and some that are ambiguous. Kennedy
does not believe that hierarchy is the root of all evil.4 No matter the impression
one is given throughout the first half of the book, as he develops it, Kennedy is
not opposed to all hierarchies, just illegitimate hierarchies, particularly the
legal hierarchy as it exists (79-81).
B. Law Schools and Hierarchy
The first third of the polemic is a series of case studies, or at least Kennedy's
observations on cases. The law schools, the faculty, the faculty and students,
and the students themselves form the hierarchies of legal education.
A hierarchy ranks the schools, with some schools more powerful and
influential, wealthier, and more desirable than others. That hierarchy "firmly
establishes that law schools exist on a scale of rank," admittedly ambiguous as
to some but clearly rejecting most from the elite (35).
The law professors' hierarchy among themselves is at first subtle but still
quite influential. In a ranking that might surprise some professors, Kennedy
describes the ranking with "rigorous" and less policy-oriented professors,
whose teaching is valuable on the bar exam, more popular and valuable than
the "softies" and "mushy centrists" (4-7).
The hierarchy most fundamental, though, is of faculty over students. This
hierarchy, in which the students accept without question the teachers' views as
truth, makes possible many others (7-13).
The dominance of the faculty over the students enables the creation of a
hierarchy among the law school's student body, based on grades and other
merit badges, especially law review membership (27, 58-71). This student
hierarchy is created and maintained by brainwashing far beyond the effects of
grades alone. Students, as Kennedy sees them, are both indoctrinated to the
internal hierarchies of the law school and prepared for the external hierar-
chies of the law, through the personal modeling of faculty obsessed with their
own status and fostering a culture of deference and acceptance (59-64) that is
furthered by the students themselves (61-69, 73-75). The professorial oli-
garchs foist as essential education what is an oblique exposure to a formal
curriculum of legal rules and reasoning, shot through with an ideological
inculcation of arbitrarily "right" and "wrong" answers that may be identified
only through acceptance of misleading professorial opinion (27-28, 47-49).
These answers must be parroted in a scheme of examinations that are useless
for any purposes other than reinforcing hierarchical values: those students
most ably embracing the teachers' opinions are the most rewarded (27-28).
4. His example of an evil not seemingly based on hierarchy is sexual jealousy (81). But most
animal behaviorists argue that access to sex is often determined by hierarchies. See, e.g.,
Frans de Waal, Chimpanzee Politics: Power and Sex Among Apes (Baltimore, 1998). Are we
really so different?
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Further, the curriculum fails to give any real skills in legal practice, and so
schools only prepare students to enter one form of practice, the large institu-
tions (14-32).
C. The Hierarchies of the Law
Kennedy sees that hierarchies within legal education are more than invidi-
ous in themselves. They embrace and enable a range of hierarchies beyond
their walls, and ideologies essential to professional hierarchies-the agenda of
center-liberal laws; the best and worst forms of professional fulfillment; the
acceptable and unacceptable methods of professional behavior. All are en-
abled by the arbitrary choices of faculty and by the manipulation of students to
accept them while still in law school.
5
The agenda of center-liberal laws arises from the errors of legal education.
These errors-the ideas that cases have a right analysis or agreement of
criticism, that the important courses are the hard courses, not the playground
courses of legal philosophy or legal history, or clinical legal education, even
the idea that contract law is distinct in the curriculum from environmental
law-"these errors have a bias in favor of the central-liberal program" (21).
This bias is, for Kennedy, the apparently inevitable result of hierarchy and
domination "which is implicit in the adoption of rules of property, contract,
and tort" appearing to be the result of legal reasoning, rather than politics and
economics. This resulting program is legal education supporting a "limited
reform of the market economy and pro forma gestures toward racial and
sexual equality." The message is that "the system is 'OK,"' with all debate
limited to only further change and improvement, rather than any fundamen-
tal criticism of the system of property, or human equality, or the perversion of
human rights into a tame discourse of acceptance of an inegalitarian world
(17-28).
The best and worst forms of professional fulfillment are both heralded and
channeled according to the hierarchy the school establishes among the stu-
dents. The best students, particularly those selected from the best schools, are
sent to the best jobs; the worst students, and those who went to the worst
schools, are sent to the worst jobs. As Kennedy sees it, the process both
reinforces the strengths and downplays the weaknesses of the law school
curriculum, by hyping the benefits of a career in a large firm and ignoring the
benefits of a career in neighborhood law practice or legal services (29). But
best and worst are ranked through the industry of legal education not only by
how a student did in law school, but also by social background and by law
school (35-37).
Thus, among the elect, the most exalted beneficiaries of legal education
are prepared both professionally and emotionally only for one of the large
5. Kennedy describes three means by which law schools contribute to legal hierarchy (or to use
my word, the "enablement") in chapters 4 and 5. Law schools train students to accept
hierarchies in school that mirror those of the profession, indoctrinate students to a legal
ideology, and rank students into groups for professional recruitment. That ranking of
students he calls "structuring," and he goes to some rather interesting extremes to show that
it is ultimately based on violence (55-57).
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firms, which will provide the training omitted from the law school curriculum,
as well as provide security in return for obedience (30-32). These firms will
offer a position "providing marginally important services to businesses in their
dealings among themselves and with consumers and stray victims" (33-34).
Firms, though, are subject to a hierarchy, within which each is "ranked just as
law schools are." The lawyers in the best firms accrue the most power, money,
and prestige, and they appear to have the top clients, courts, and offices, and
they do the most challenging work (36). So they "lord it over those below
them, and so forth to the bottom" (35).
The lesser strata of legal employment follow. Thejobs remaining after the
firms have skimmed the cream are either plaintiffs work or "arranging
the private affairs" of the middle or upper classes (presumably wills and
trusts) (34).
The acceptable and unacceptable methods of professional behavior taught
to students commenced, for Kennedy, in grade school.6 Since then, education
has badgered students for their failings, preparing them to accept depen-
dence on large institutions, which will give them tasks limited enough for their
paltry talents, in return for loyalty to education's own hierarchies: of senior
over junior staff (31, 49), 7 judges over lawyers (38-39), lawyers over clients
(40). In exchange for money and security, the lawyer will surrender control
over work and affections, agreeing "to show the appropriate form of defer-
ence to those above ... and condescension to those below" (31). This work
itself is "drudge work" solving puzzles in a macho battle of wills in which
winning is all. The only fulfillment comes in achieving the goals of other
people. And although Kennedy admits that the lawyer also exercises skill,
makes money, and gains the respect of others, he reminds us that this is far less
than any dream of pursuing a career of unambiguous goodness (34-35).8
Most fundamental is the final hierarchy, the social arrangement in which
lawyers are treated as "the elite of the nation." Such a perception is based on
not even a mote of service to the public or to the truth, boot-strapped by
lawyers out of all proportion into a "massive edifice of prestige and material
over-reward" (41).
D. Kennedy's Resistance
It might go without saying at this stage that Kcnncdy thinks legal hierar-
chies are bad things. It is essential to his project to sec why he thinks so. It is
not just that the contingent valuations of organizations are irrational or self
6. This might exaggerate his point, but only slightly. He says, "Law school, as an extension of the
educational system as a whole, teaches students they are weak, lazy, incompetent, and
insecure" (31).
7 The internal hierarchy of partners over associates, over secretaries, over messengers is
described at 38-39.
8. Having set out this dystopian view of law practice, Kennedy admits to its slight exaggeration,
even allowing that a student who is determined to find a meaningful job, by which he means
one that is politically progressive, can indeed do so, so long as the student is willing to
relocate and to wait. He also admits that some lawyers, apparently in the most pernicious
roles in the hierarchy writ large, have meaningful jobs that benefit others (43-44).
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serving or that they perpetuate other injustices in society (78). The legal
hierarchy he has encountered is worse: it is an unneccesary evil (80).
Kennedy argues more deeply that hierarchy itself is to be hated, even in any
aspect that is necessary owing to the divisions of labor in a complex task. "We
should attack the spirit of hierarchy as it manifests itself in ideology and in all
the details of expressive behavior" he has identified (79). As we have seen,
Kennedy realizes that "hierarchy" is vague, including some relationships that
are perverse and some that are not, and some that are ambiguous. So he is in
fact not against all possible hierarchies,just the legal hierarchy as it exists. This
distinction leads him to his definition of the best students (and presumably
the best lawyers and professors).
Kennedy's choice is a radical, defined as one who is not against all hierarchy,
"since sometimes we accept it," nor against only illegitimate hierarchies, "since
we're against that." The radical is one who wants immediately "to dismantle
existing structures of hierarchy that look evil" and subvert "the forces that keep
them in place" (61). The radical should attempt to transform the hierarchy
"cell by cell, until we reach the critical point at which the interconnectedness
of the system makes it possible to develop it as a whole toward a new unity" (98).
The resistance necessary to transform the unity is therefore appropriate
everywhere from welfare offices to law school classrooms to dinner parties. This
resistance, motivated not only by the traditional liberal desire to help the less
fortunate but also by the solidarity with others maimed by hierarchies' alien-
ation from their inherent powers, is best served (in the absence of a leftist mass
movement) by organizing "a left intelligentsia in the workplace" to attack
essentialist and generational and meritocratic stratifications and the discipline
necessary to enforce such hierarchy (101-02).
Such rebellions in law school ought to begin with Kennedy's left (not
leftist) study group. These groups are to inflame their members to act up in
authoritarian classes, to demand curricular reforms, and to engage in utopian
thinking about an ideal form of social arrangement that puts an end to the
hidden ideology of institutions (108-12, 118).' In wonderful fashion Kennedy
argues that leadership in such study groups is not an office but a function of
task, which can be rotated among members and diffused, although "when
someone is doing something well and no one feels they threaten to turn their
performance into illegitimate power, it makes sense to reap the benefit of
[that person's] expertise" (117).
E. The Anticlimax
Rereading Kennedy's polemic for this article, I was struck anew at the
power of its argument compared to the restraint of its conclusions. Again and
again, the hierarchies of the law are mapped and trashed, but the strategy for
their demise isjarringly pragmatic. The romance of the prose lambasting the
9. The tactics for forming a left study group and its functions are dealt with throughout chapter
9; a utopian proposal for law schools is presented at 120-23.
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unearned rewards of the hierarchs threatens to overwhelm the calls for staff
equality (127). There are careful limitations on whom the students are to
oppose, not all faculty but specially those who use sexist jokes or abuse the
Socratic dialog (109-10). This is precision rebellion against specific targets
meaningful to Kennedy's audience and reachable by their action.
The impression formed by the book as a whole is, though, much closer to
the romantic sweep of the initial condemnations of the legal hierarchy than to
the careful roadmap to rebellion at its end. The first six chapters are rife with
vigorous attacks on hierarchies within hierarchies and their unearned and
irrational benefits, which thwart the potential for more radical reforms of the
underlying social inequity. Given even the caveats and qualifications that peek
out from the ends of chapters, it is to answer the call of these attacks that
Kennedy calls us to examine the power of the hierarchy.
[1. Hierarchy: From Culture in Theory to Theory in Culture
The concept of hierarchy is ancient, although the word is ecclesiastical.
The concept of a system of higher orders is already at least as old as Aristote-
lian biology and politics."0 The word hierarchia (iepapXuix), from the word for
bishop (6cpX ), was used initially to describe the office of bishops and later the
pope." The first employment of hierarchy in its current sense appears to be in
the fifth-century writings of the pseudo-Dionysius, who built on Jewish tradi-
tions to present the angels in a sacred arrangement of order and ranks,
according to perfection and nearness to God, which he then applied to the
organization of the church.' 2 It entered English usage early, used by John
Wycliffe in the fourteenth century to describe the angelic bureaucracy.
1 3
The theological implications of hierarchy led, quite directly, to a biological
fascination with it, inspiring the great taxonomy of Linnaeus.
1 4 With post-
Darwinian biology, a new form of hierarchy, the ecosystem, has become the
10. Aristotle presented numerous theories that are hierarchical in their structure, none so
profound for the nature of organization as his hierarchy for the organism. His logos, or
psyche, of all living entities consisted of six functions-nutrition, perception, desire, locomo-
tion, imagery, and reason-each of which is a predicate for the others. (In this, Aristotle's
theory presages Maslow's twentieth-century "hierarchy of needs.") See Aristotle, On the Soul,
and chapters I and 14 of the Politics, which in turn support hierarchies of beings and of
goods.
11. The word hierarcha or hierarchia is not found in classic texts. It appears to be prominently
found in ecclesiastical texts in the tenth century to describe the papal court. See Leo F.
Stelten, Dictionary of Ecclesiastical Latin 308 q.v. in Appendix (Peabody, 1995).
12. See The Celestial Hierarchy and The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy in Pseudo-Dionysius the
Areopagite, The Complete Works, trans. Cohm Luibheid (New York, 1987). The pseudo-
Dionysius is an obvious influence on Aquinas's hierarchies of angels. See Thomas Aquinas, 1
Summa Theologica 528-39 (part I, question 108), trans. English Dominican Fathers (New
York, 1948).
13. See the pseudo-Dionysian reference of the father of Lollardry, John Wycliffe, in Sermones
11:338 in The English Works ofJohn Wyclif, ed. F. D. Matthew (London, 1880). "[Th] er ben
[th]ree ierarchies," representing the three orders of angels in the psuedo-Dionysus.
14. The theological and biological overlap of these conceptions has been long debated through
the metaphor of the great chain of being. See Arthur 0. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being:
A Study of the History of an Idea (New York, 1965).
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conceptual framework of the field.1" Other fields of the sciences, particularly
chemistry and thermodynamics, have also embraced hierarchy as a fundamen-
tal scheme of organization. 6
A. Theories of Hierarchies in Human Cultures
The notion of hierarchy in social science was famously established in the
critiques of Hegel's theory of the hierarchical bureaucracy made by Karl
Marx, who argued that the domination of the hierarchy substitutes for the
humanity of the civil servant." That argument fits well with the broader thrust
of Marx's critique, that capitalists' parasitism of workers' labor is the funda-
mental evil in society."
Yet the Marxian argument that hierarchy is illegitimate is countered in
social science by Max Weber's observations of hierarchy as essential, particu-
larly in bureaucracy. Weber asserts that hierarchy is the only efficient means
for state administration. A bureaucracy's "principles of office hierarchy and of
levels of graded authority mean a firmly ordered system of super- and subordi-
nation in which there is a supervision of the lower offices by the higher
ones." 9 Therefore, a bureaucracy is the most efficient means of rational
management of a state."
The study of human hierarchies developed rapidly in the twentieth cen-
tury, particularly in its second half. The academic studies in many disci-
plines-particularly anthropology, sociology, political science, and manage-
15. The ecological literature of hierarchies is vast and growing. See, e.g., T. F. H. Allen & Thomas
B. Starr, Hierarchy: Perspectives for Ecological Complexity (Chicago, 1982). A wonderful
example of this literature is Paul Colinvaux, Why Big Fierce Animals Are Rare: An Ecologist's
Perspective (Princeton, 1978).
16. Hierarchy is only one form of organization of physical systems, others being heterarchy and,
of course, chaos. The fundamental question is how chaotic systems become stable, and
hierarchy is frequently the result Among the most influential writings in this often contested
field is Gr6goire Nicolis & Ilya Prigogine, Self-Organization in Nonequilibrium Systems:
From Dissipative Structures to Order Through Fluctuations (New York, 1977), discussed in
Valerie Ahl & T. F. H. Allen, Hierarchy Theory (New York, 1996).
17. Karl Marx, Critique of Hegel's "Philosophy of Right" 51-54, trans. Annette John & Joseph
O'Malley (critiquing Hegel §§ 254-56) (Cambridge, 1970). The most complete discussion of
Marx's view of hierarchy in bureaucracy appears to be Pierre Naville, De L'ali6nation S la
jouissance, la gen~se de la sociologie du travail chez Marx et Engels (Paris, 1957), cited in
Nicos P. Mouzelis, Organisation and Bureaucracy: An Analysis of Modern Theories 9 n.183
(New York, 1967).
18. Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, trans. Ben Fowkes (New York, 1992).
19. Max Weber, Bureaucracy, in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology 197, eds. & trans. H. H.
Gerth & C. Wright Mills (New York, 1946).
20. See, e.g., id. at 223. Weber's discussion of bureaucracy is a theme in many of his writings. See
particularly his essays Domination and Political Communities, in Max Weber on Law in
Economy and Society, ed. Max Rheinstein, trans. Edward Shils & Max Rheinstein, 334 (New
York, 1954). Weber was not alone in reaching these conclusions; Durkheim did so more
critically. See Emile Durkheim, Individualism and the Intellectuals, in Durkheim, On Moral-
ity and Society: Selected Writings, ed. Robert N. Bellah (Chicago, 1973); Emile Durkheim,
The Division of Labour in Society, trans. G. Simpson (1893) (Basingstoke, 1984).
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ment-tend to divide along the fault lines between Marx and Weber."1 Some
authors emphasize the efficiency and inevitability of hierarchy, and others
merely accept them as facts of organizational life and describe the usual--or
attempt to model the best-behaviors within a hierarchy. Still others empha-
size the alienation and injustice it can cause.
The model of hierarchy as a tool of corporate efficiency is dear to the heart
of industrial management. As well as management studies in the tradition of
time-and-motion efficiency studies, anthropologists have added theoretical
dimensions of the relationship of elites to non-elite.22 One of the most fre-
quent assertions in the field is that leaders are always, or nearly always,
inclined to take a greater proportion of rewards than they will offer to
followers.2 3 Many studies therefore take hierarchy for granted but then at-
tempt to model best behaviors within it, such as an ideal distribution of
rewards for those at the top of the pyramid.24
Perhaps the most influential book of theory to emphasize the illegitimacy
of hierarchy was Louis Dumont's Homo Hierarchicus.2 Dumont, a French
structural sociologist, studied the caste system of India, comparing Indian
cultural commitments to hierarchical strata to American commitments to
equality. He contrasted "natural hierarchies," in which the individual's iden-
tity was wholly dependent on hierarchical value, with "rational societies" in
which the individual has mobility in society as a whole, albeit subject to
commands in contingent hierarchical situations. Although Dumont was more
concerned with distinguishing the caste system, effectively a hierarchy in
which no mobility is possible, from systems in which value is more malleable,
he still recognized the "iron law" of Talcott Parsons and noted every society is
a system of systems, some of which, such as the then-prevalent American
discrimination based on race, are iniquitous.
6
Through the 1960s to the present, the theoretical literature of hierarchy
has grown steadily wider, both as earlier writings were criticized and refined 27
and as new models were developed and applied to more diverse populations
21. Certain fields in social science use the concept of hierarchy in ways that do not reflect the
Marx/Weber dichotomy, using hierarchy as an organizing device in a manner more akin to
the physical or biological sciences. One example of this is the hierarchy of grammar,
associated with a then-young Noam Chomsky. See Noam Chomsky, Three Models for the
Description of Language, 2 IRE Transactions on Information Theory 113 (1956).
22. See, e.g., Arnold S. Tennenbaum et al., Hierarchy in Organizations (San Fransisco, 1974).
23. See, e.g., Robert Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tenden-
cies of Modern Democracy, trans. Eden Paul & Cedar Paul (New York, 1959); Melvin M.
Tumin, Social Stratification, Forms and Functions of Inequality (Englewood Cliffs, 1969).
24. See, e.g., Herbert A. Simon, The Compensation of Executives, 20 Socionsetry 30 (1957).
25. Homo Hierarchicus: The Caste System and Its Implications, trans. Mike Sainsbury, 2d rev. ed.
(Chicago, 1980).
26. Id. at 235-59.
27. See, e.g., Chris Smaje, Natural Hierarchies: The Historical Sociology of Race and Caste
(Malden, 2000).
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for study.2" Interdisciplinary models proliferated, in which particularly bio-
logical (especially ecological) models of hierarchy have been increasingly
considered interchangeably with models from human culture.29 And while
the law is still concerned with its effects on social hierarchy," business march-
es onward.3
B. Theories of Hierarchies in American Pop Culture
In 1967 flakes from the dry tomes of social science were brought into the
public eye through an unusual book by Arthur Koestler, a Hungarian living in
England. Koestler had achieved international recognition for his 1940 novel
Darkness at Noon, which exposed the evils of Stalinist Russia. A quarter-century
later he wrote The Ghost in the Machine, 2 a book that achieved a mass audience
outside the academy. In it Koestler presented and developed the biological
and linguistic evidence for the inevitability of hierarchy as an organizing
principle, as well as a variety of arguments from human experience. He coined
the term holon for the janus-like place of a single unit in a hierarchy, in which
the holon has both singular and corporate aspects at the same time. Most
compellingly, he depicted ways in which corrupt hierarchies in human society
had developed technology far beyond the moral compass of individuals to
manage its dangers. He saw the only hope for mankind in the potential
for altruism by the members of hierarchies to allow for a regeneration of
their holons, in essence seeking to inprove the lot of both the individual and
the hierarchy.3
In the 1980s, even as the cultural influence of Koestler's book might have
begun to fade, at least outside the precincts of university sociology depart-
ments, a sudden surge in awareness of his theories came from a most unpre-
dictable source: rock music. The Police, a British trio of some fame, released
The Ghost in the Machine, their fourth album, in 1981. It comprised nine songs
with lyrics drawn largely from Koestler's work, expressed in dark and evocative
melodies against tense, sometimes threatening backgrounds. 34 The album
28. See, e.g., the writings collected in Hierarchical Structures: Proceedings, ed. Lancelot L.
Whyte (New York, 1969), and in Hierarchy Theory: The Challenge of Complex Systems, ed.
Howard H. Pattee (NewYork, 1973).
29. T. F. H. Allen & Thomas W. Hoekstra, Toward a Unified Ecology (New York, 1992).
30. SeeJ. M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 Yale L.J. 2313 (1997).
31. See, e.g., Jan W. Rivkin & Nicholaj Siggelkow, Balancing Search and Stability: Interdepen-
dencies Among Elements of Organizational Design (Boston, 2003); Oliver D. Hart, On the
Design of Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Specialization (Olin Foundation Paper, Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard Law School, 1999).
32. Chicago, 1967. The title rifled on a famous line of Gilbert Ryle's on the Cartesian mind-body
distinction, that to separate them was "a dogma of a Ghost in a Machine." The Concept of
Mind 23 (New York, 1949).
33. The Ghost in the Machine is written with great style, and it rewards careful reading. To quickly
locate these and other component arguments, Koestler did the reader a rare service by a
modern author, in outlining his arguments. See id. at 341-48.
34. Not that every song did. "Every Little Thing She Does Is Magic" was a nice pop number
destined to top the singles chart.
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went platinum in three months. 5 While the lyrics sometimes consisted of
mantra-like repetition, their presentation of Koestler's central themes-of
hierarchy as a crippling danger, of the ineffectiveness of political solutions, of
the risks of hierarchically managed technology-was hard to miss.
3 6
C. Kennedy and the Zeitgeist in 1983
Kennedy's book-finished in 1983, privately printed, and distributed
through the Harvard Coop and from hand to hand-captured nicely the spirit
of the moment. Written for highly educated students, many of whose readings
had included assignments and research in the social sciences, and for faculty
who were deeply invested in the theory of social science, Kennedy's argument
about hierarchy tacitly embraced much of the core of the literature, easily
placing itself within a well-established field. Moreover, his obvious use of the
Marxist criticism of hierarchy resonated well with his underlying agenda, to
criticize the superstructures of the law.
Kennedy's genius was to seize at the same time on one of the few concepts
of social theory that would be already seen by students, at that moment, as
relevant, important, and dangerous. The authority of cultural icons, coupled
with the power of the mass market, had made a fertile field in which Kennedy
planted a well-timed seed. In this light, it is little wonder that his polemic
found such wide acceptance with such a theoretical argument.
HI. Resistance: Missing the Point of Hierarchy in Law and Society
Despite the heat of Kennedy's premises, his conclusions are tepid in com-
parison. One can hardly argue against the idea that students are enmeshed in
hierarchy, that law schools prepare them to become lawyers, or that lawyers
work in a legal hierarchy, with some judges at the top, and lawyers and
scholars of various stripes scaling down. Nor can anyone doubt that this
hierarchy is enmeshed in the hierarchies of society as a whole. Indeed, it is
difficult to reject the view that some of the powerful abuse their power in all of
these hierarchies, as when law teachers tell sexist jokes in class or law firm
partners abuse associates' talents. And one would be foolish not to see that the
law often supports unjust arrangements in society. Yet the conclusion that
Kennedy draws from this-his solution to resist, even in merely attacking
35. See the chronology at <http://www.rockonthenet.com/artists-p/policehtm>.
36. The first track, "Spirits in the Material World," opens with the following, by Sting:
There is no political solution
To our troubled evolution
Have no faith in constitution
There is no bloody revolution
Refrain [repeat four times]:
We are spirits in the material world
The lyrics, all by Sting or Andy Summers, of"Invisible Sun," "Demolition Man," "Too Much
Information," "Rehumanize Yourself," "One World (Not Three)," and "Omegaman" simi-
larly follow Koestlerian lines.
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those hierarchies that "feel" illegitimate-is much weaker than these premises
might support. 7
It might be that one source of this weakness derives from his comparatively
unexamined implication that a leftist ethic is either the best answer to illegiti-
mate hierarchy or, at least, the only possibly effective answer. That would be a
pat, if political, objection, but it is probably irrelevant.
A more interesting question is whether Kennedy could more sufficiently
balance his Marxist view of hierarchical criticism with caveats of Weberian
acceptance. If some forms of hierarchy are inevitable, what work must a
student or lawyer do to distinguish those that are good from those that are
illegitimate? Are feelings and appearance really sufficient?
With that question, another look at Kennedy's depiction of the fundamen-
tal hierarchies of the law is in order. In drawing his dystopian picture of the
law schools, the practice of law, and the society enabled by lawyers, Kennedy
admittedly skewed the perspective. But one skew he never admitted: his
view that the law taught in law schools, indeed the law itself, is nothing more
than simple rules and techniques cloaked in policies chosen arbitrarily by
law professors.
If the law is more than that, if it is indeed a hierarchy in which membership
requires a dedication to particular ethics and obligations, then criticism of
that hierarchy must take two forms that Kennedy did not really confront: what
those ethics and obligations are, and how well the hierarchy instills their
respect and compliance. In other words, if the enterprise of the law requires
an aspect of justice, or if there is an inner logic of protecting the corporate
concerns of lawyers, then Kennedy's critique is misdirected.
To be sure, he feels the tug in this direction, but he rejects it as naive. In his
first chapter, he considers two stories that a hapless student might accept on
the eve of law school: in the first, the student hopes for a Brandeisian role of
public service in a noble profession; in the second, the student recognizes the
profession's venal servitude to "established interests" of social "dominators"
but sees law as a tool of social transformation (1-3). Both stories share views of
the law that could be held not only by the law student but also by many lawyers,
judges, legislators, and law teachers. So why did Kennedy somehow lose the
thread of that second story? What happened to the student who saw herself "as
part technician, partjudo expert, able to turn the tables exactly because she
never lets herself be mystified by the rhetoric that is so important to other
students" (2)? Kennedy lost that thread by accepting a view of legal education,
of the law itself, in which everything taught in law school-except for the
formal rules themselves and the argumentative techniques for manipulating
them-is policy and nothing more.
37. Two arguments recently considered the significance of law both as a hierarchy in itself and as
an influence on wider social hierarchies, reflecting new twists in this model. Gunther
Teubner considers the first real threat to law's hierarchical authority to be the integration of
competing national conceptions of law as a result of globalization. See The King's Many
Bodies: The Self-Deconstruction of Law's Hierarchy, 31 Law & Soc'y Rev. 763 (1997). Jack
Balkin has argued strongly for an obligation of law to the democratic enterprise to pursue
and destroy hierarchies that perpetuate cultural bias. See Balkin, supra note 30.
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When the law is seen as a tradition that has demanded adherence to
particular values, even if these values are contingent and changing, and even if
they are in some degree arbitrary, then the law is more than tools for the
benefit of lawyers' clientele, which perpetuate an unjust society. When law is
seen from that perspective, there is room to see it as one of the few tools
sufficiently powerful to effect change in the illegitimate and unjust hierarchies
of society as a whole. It is precisely this power, dedicated to aspects ofjustice
that law alone may bring to bear on social issues, that has made the legal
hierarchy capable of limiting tyranny and ending slavery. The integration of
women into the workplace and the ongoing transformation of culture to end
discrimination are the results of transformations implemented and promoted
by lawyers using the tools of law.
Which is more likely to refine the hierarchy of law and sharpen its pursuit
ofjustice-to charge students to resist hierarchies they think illegitimate, or to
charge them to promote hierarchies they can believe, with reason, promote
justice in society?
Kennedy's answer is to reject the center-liberal agenda, which rests on an
undue acceptance of illegitimate laws. By that reasoning, efforts by law schools
and other legal institutions to promote a constructive agenda forjustice must
be thwarted because they imply a defense of outmoded and unfair concep-
tions of property or contract.
At its furthest extent, such a response prefers a radical rejection of the law
to the employment of law as a barrier to injustices. It prefers a model of laws as
arbitrary to a model of laws that bind lawyers to reasoned bases for action to
which they must advise their clients. It is to prefer no ideological framework
over one contingent on selection by lawyers, even if such selections would
then serve as barriers to immoral or illegitimate conduct by those bound to
obey the law.
At its heart, Kennedy's notion of law shears away the notion that the lawyer
must serve the law before the client. By removing a substantive aspect of the
rules of law, he leaves no substantive obligations for the lawyer, freeing the
lawyer to do exactly what Kennedy complains most about: serve the hierarchs.
There are, of course, all too many examples of this behavior in the law
already. A recent example of lawyers giving the bosses what they want is the
awful specter of government lawyers advising the president and members of
the cabinet that they were unconstrained by law in their treatment of foreign
prisoners seized in combat or foreign occupations. Worse, they advised their
governmental hierarchies to accept the least possible constraints of the law in
torturing their prisoners, and advised them of tactics to thwart attempts by
others to enforce the law as written."5
38. See Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Memorandum from the Office of the Assistant
Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, to White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, Aug.
1, 2002. Bybee concluded that the statute, 18 U.S.C. 2340, 2340A, and the Torture Conven-
tion to which the United States is a party prevent only extreme cruelty, and that "certain acts
may be cruel, inhuman, or degrading, but still not produce suffering of the requisite intensity
to fall within Section 2340A's proscription against torture." The memo asserts that the statute
only forbids "pain equivalent in intensity to pain accompanying serious physical injury, such
as organ failure, impairment of bodily function or even death." These limitations do not
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If one needs proof of Kennedy's argument of the danger of hierarchy, its
holons prepared by law schools to serve unjust ends, this would be a fine
exhibit, if but one in a long line that includes all too many lawyers in American
and human history who have dismantled the law to serve their master's whims.
Yet this was not an inevitable result of the law, and it was certainly contrary to
what these lawyers might have done had they been more subordinate to a
hierarchy in the law than to one in the government. Indeed these memoranda
provoked outrage among the higher reaches of the legal hierarchy.
39
The question that must then be asked is whether the lawyers who gave such
counsel would probably have been better prepared to act justly (or legiti-
mately) if they had followed Kennedy's advice, or better prepared in some
other manner. The history of legal education, its ability to produce and
support the lawyers who work for justice, indeed Louis Brandeis, the very
example in Kennedy's allusion, suggests that mere resistance cannot achieve
what a dedication to a substantive conception of the law can achieve.4" As Paul
Carrington suggested in his contribution to the Kennedy republication, the
question is not whether there will be legal hierarchy but whether anyone can
reproduce hierarchies of the right sort (145).
appear in the statue itself, which forbids acts "specifically intended to inflict severe physical
or mental pain or suffering," including threats to do so. The memo failed to address the
broader limitations that United States accepted under the treaty.
See alsoJohn Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel & RobertJ.
Delahunty, Special Counsel, Memorandum for William Haynes II, General Counsel, Depart-
ment of Defense, Jan. 9, 2002, regarding the Application of Treaties and Laws to al Quaeda
and Taliban Detainees. The authors concluded that neither the War Crimes Act, 28 U.S.C. §
2441, nor the Geneva Conventions, nor the customary laws of war "bind the President or
restrict the actions of the United States military." Id. at 2. These conclusions were based on
both the express criticism of 100 years of U.S. case law and rejection of the express language
of article 2 of the Geneva Convention of 1949.
Since writing these memoranda, Bybee has been made a federal judge, Haynes has been
nominated for another judgeship, and Yoo has become a Berkeley law professor. Yoo
defends his actions, claiming that thejob of the lawyer is to provide legal options to a client
without regard to their implications for morality or policy, in John Yoo, A Crucial Look at
Torture Law, L.A. Times, July 6, 2004, available at <http://www.aei.org/news/
filter.all,newslD.20846/newsdetail.asp>. Perhaps it is obvious, but I think this is a warped
and incomplete view of the role of a government lawyer.
39. See Resolution of the American Bar Association House of Delegates, Aug. 9, 2004, condemn-
ing not only torture but also "any endorsement or authorization of such measures by
government lawyers, officials and agents." This resolution followed an open letter to the
president from more than 100 lawyers, law teachers, and judges, condemning the memo-
randa of Bybee and Yoo. See Scott Higham, Law Experts Condemn U.S. Memos on Torture,
Wash. Post, Aug. 5, 2004, at A4.
40. For a more detailed treatment of one model of this concept, wait for my The Moral
Obligations of Legal Officials, which will, one hopes, be published in 2007.
